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SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
AND POLITICAL CANDIDACY AS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT - PATY V. MCDANIEL
"Render therefore, unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and
unto God the things that are God's.' Quoting the Bible and taking
judicial notice of the religious composition of the State of Tennessee,
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Paty v. McDaniel2 upheld Article
IX, Section 1, of the Constitution of Tennessee which bars priests and
ministers of any denomination from holding a seat in either house of
the state legislature. 3 The purpose of this Note will be to analyze
the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court and to predict how the
United States Supreme Court will respond to appellant's arguments
based on free exercise of religion and equal protection.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Tennessee State Legislature called for a limited constitutional
convention to take place in 1977,4 and set the requirements for dele-
gates to be the same as those for membership in the House of Rep-
resentatives, thus invoking Article IX, Section 1 of the state constitu-
tion. 5 Selma Cash Paty, a candidate for the office of delegate to the
convention, brought suit to have the Reverend Paul A. McDaniel, an
opposing candidate, declared ineligible because of his position as a
Baptist minister. 6  Rev. McDaniel defended arguing that the Tennes-
see provision violated the free exercise and establishment clauses of
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 7 as applied to
1. Matthew 22:21.
2. 547 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1977).
3. TENN. CONST. art. IX, § 1 provides:
Whereas Ministers of the Gospel are by their profession dedicated to God and
the care of souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their func-
tions; therefore no Minister of the Gospel, or priest of any denomination whatever,
shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the Legislature.
4. 1976 TENN. PUB. ACTS ch. 848.
5. Id.
6. Because of delays in the litigation, by the time the Tennessee Supreme Court had a
chance to decide the question, the election had already taken place and the Rev. McDaniel was
victorious. The final vote tally read: Paul A. McDaniel 4570, Selma Cash Paty 2944, Samuel
Lee Doney 900, and Ralph W. Timberlake 743.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
The establishment clause assertions made by Rev. McDaniel will not be discussed in this
Note. Rev. McDaniel argued that:
Article IX discloses a sectarian bias on its face-it applies only to "ministers of the
Gospel" and "priests of any denomination whatever." The gospel obviously refers to
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:217
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Rev. McDaniel also
argued that Article IX, Section 1, violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Chancery Court of Hamilton County, Tennessee held that the
exclusion of ministers from public office infringed upon the free exer-
cise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed and declared Rev. McDaniel to be ineligible
for the office of delegate to the 1977 Constitutional Convention. 8a
Rev. McDaniel appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court stayed the order of the Tennessee Supreme Court
and noted probable jurisdiction on June 15, 1977.ab Oral arguments
were heard on December 5, 1977.
THE FREE EXERCISE ARGUMENT
Historically, plaintiffs have not successfully asserted free exercise
claims before the United States Supreme Court. 9 Under free exer-
cise challenges, the conduct affected by the law in question is
categorized as either religious belief, which is protected from gov-
ernment interference, or religious action, which is not protected. 10
the Bible. The meaning of the word "gospel" is "Good news" and is used in a
religious context exclusively by Christians to mean "Good news of Jesus." . . .
Thus, apparently neither rabbis of the Jewish faith nor their counterparts among
Buddhists, Confuscians, Taoists or Mohammedans would be excluded from candi-
dacy by Article IX.
Brief for Appellant at 17-18, Paty v. McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1977). The
court adequately dealt with this issue and was correct in holding that "the phrase . .. 'priests of
any denomination whatever' is intended to embrace the counterparts of ministers, priests, and
rabbis in every religious sect, whatever may be their title or designation." 547 S.W.2d at 908.
8. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Supreme Court held that the
religious protection secured by the First Amendment was embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment. The latter amendment rendered the states as incompetent as Congress to enact
laws violating the religious protections.
8a. 547 S.W.2d at 910.
8b. 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977).
9. See Pfeffer, The Supremacy Of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1130 (1973). In the
cases which upheld a free exercise claim, the assertion was linked with either a freedom of
speech or freedom of press claim as well. Conversely, when the free exercise claim was made
alone it was unsuccessful. In reality free exercise claims were treated as though they occupied a
place of lesser prominence in the scope of First Amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Heisler v. Board of Review, 343 U.S. 939 (1952); Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffen, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hamilton v. Regents,
293 U.S. 245 (1934); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890); and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). This line of cases is not all
inclusive. For other cases see Pfeffer, supra at 1130 nn.114, 115.
10. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 603-04 (1961). To keep the free exercise clause viable, the belief-action dichotomy must not
be rigidly applied. Since most religious practices involve some elements of action, a certain
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Religious practices are often treated as action in cases challenging
laws on free exercise grounds.'1 Legislation may impose a minor
burden or inconvenience upon religious practices, but the establish-
ment clause prevents the state or federal government from making a
religious practice itself unlawful. 12  The state may reach specific re-
ligious conduct with regulatory laws which have a secular purpose
and which are a valid exercise of a state's Tenth Amendment 13 police
power in the areas of public health, safety, and welfare. 14 Neverthe-
less, even an incidental burden on the free exercise of religion must
be justified by a compelling state interest.15 Further, there must be
no alternative means available to the state which would accomplish its
goal without imposing such a burden. 16
The Tennessee Supreme Court's Analysis
In beginning its analysis the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that
the only case involving the identical issue was Kirkley v. Mary-
land. 17 The court dismissed the importance of that decision by
pointing out that the governor and the attorney general of the State
of Maryland admitted the unconstitutionality of a Maryland constitu-
tional provision similar to Tennessee's. The lack of analysis in Kirkley
left the Tennessee Supreme Court free to apply its own analysis.
The Tennessee Supreme Court first classified the conduct governed
by Article IX, Section 1, as the following of a profession, which is
secular action, and concluded that there was no restriction on Rev.
McDaniel's religious beliefs. The ministry, however, is an expression
amount of flexibility is needed to allow for free exercise protection. See Pfeffer, supra note 9, at
1122.
11. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds the Court upheld the
bigamy conviction of George Reynolds. Reynold's defense was that the Utah law outlawing
bigamy was a violation of his free exercise of religion. Reynolds, a Mormon, believed the tenet
of his faith calling for all male members of the Mormon Church to practice polygamy as part of
their religious duty. The Court upheld the conviction calling the conduct in question action
rather than belief. The Court drew an analogy between the proscribed conduct at issue here-
polygamy-and a belief in human sacrifice. Id. at 166.
12. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
13. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
14. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878).
15. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). This case is discussed in detail in note 29
and accompanying text infra.
16. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). See generally Comment, A Uniform
Valuation of the Religion Gurarantees, 80 YALE L.J. 77, 78, 79 (1970).
17. 381 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 1974) (the case was decided on equal protection grounds).
1977]
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of Rev. McDaniel's belief. Living one's religion as an expression of
belief is not a novel concept or a distinction based on semantics.18 A
man or woman can in few ways manifest a greater belief in his or her
religion than to enter its ministry.
The Tennessee Supreme Court cited two decisions to support its
analysis. It relied on Everson v. Board of Education, 19 as holding
that religious organizations are prohibited from participating in gov-
ernmental activity. In addition, the court cited Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education 20 for the proposition that there
must be an absolute wall of separation between church and state.2 '
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, went too far in its appli-
cation of the separation doctrine. It set up the State of Tennessee as
an adversary to religion by excluding the clergy from participating in
certain governmental functions. This is not in line with the Everson
decision which commanded states to be neutral in dealing with reli-
gious matters. 22 Further, government hostility toward religion is
contrary to our national tradition of freedom of religion embodied in
the First Amendment. 23
18. Several authors have already noted the problems presented by such restrictions:
[I]t may well be argued that to deny the right to hold public office to one because
he chooses to live his religion in the role of a clergyman also violates religious
freedom. Such an individual is discriminated against not because he is religious, but
because he is a religious. If he were only religious he would be eligible . . . . To
this extent the disqualification clauses in the Maryland and Tennessee constitutions
may well be invalid.
C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL, & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 160
(1965). Subsequent to this book's publication, the Maryland provision was declared unconstitu-
tional. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
19. 330 U.S. 1 (1948). In Everson the Court upheld a New Jersey statute authorizing local
school districts to make rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and from schools
(including parochial schools). The Court said the establishment clause was meant to erect a wall
of separation between church and state, id. at 16, but felt that the New Jersey statute did not
constitute a violation of that separation.
20. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The Court in McCollum struck down, as a violation of the estab-
lishment clause, the use of public school classrooms by religious teachers for thirty minutes a
week during regular school hours. Attendance at the religious instruction was voluntary al-
though all children had to remain in school and pursue their secular studies if they chose not to
attend the religious classes.
21. Id. at 212.
22. Everson stated: "[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its rela-
tions with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary. State power is no more to be used to handicap religions than it is to favor
them." 330 U.S. at 18. Separation of church and state should not be read as an absolute com-
mand. Even the author of the phrase, Thomas Jefferson, did not treat it as such. Acting on
behalf of the University of Virginia, Jefferson recognized that providing for voluntary religious
studies and activities is proper to avoid discrimination against religion. See Katz, Freedom of
Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426, 431 (1953).
23. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211, 212 (1948). However,
Justice Frankfurter viewed the separation doctrine in absolute terms, much the same way as the
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After misreading and misapplying Everson, the Tennessee Supreme
Court took judicial notice of the religious composition of the state and
felt that clergymen of the three dominant religions 24 would enjoy a
distinct political advantage if allowed to run for office. 25 This argu-
ment is not weighty in light of the fact that the restriction imposed by
the Tennessee Constitution does not apply to other important elected
offices such as the governor of the state. 26  It is also questionable
whether or not any real political advantage could be gained by a re-
ligious sect.27  Therefore, the state's interest here is clearly not com-
pelling enough to warrant a restriction of the free exercise of religion
by ministers.
In concluding its analysis, the court felt that the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Braunfeld v. Brown 28 was sufficiently
Tennessee Supreme Court. He stated:
Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing
the relationship between Church and State speaks of a "wall of separation," not of a
fine line easily overstepped. . . . We renew our conviction that "we have staked
the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the
state and religion is best for the state and best for religion."
Id. at 231-32 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), quoting Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 59.
24. Baptists, Methodists, and Catholics separately and collectively outnumber all other re-
ligious groups in the State of Tennessee. 547 S.W.2d at 904.
25. The advantage the court felt should be avoided was the supposed ability of the religious
leaders in the three dominant sects to lead a campaign from their pulpits which would give
them a far more extensive voter base from which to launch a campaign for office. Id. at 904.
26. Setting the requirements for governor, TENN. CONST. art 3. § 3, provides: "He shall be
at least thirty years of age, shall be a citizen of the United States, and shall have been a citizen
of the state seven years next before his election."
27. It has been noted that:
Even assuming that clergy of all faiths were permitted freely by their churches to
campaign for office, 'it is quite unlikely that enough of a particular faith or denomi-
nation could be elected to have any detrimental effect. In any event the conflict of
interest, if such there be, should not be cognizable by the state.
C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL, & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 106 (1965).
28. 366 U.S. 599 (1961). In Braunfeld the Court sustained the validity of a Pennsylvania
Sunday closing law. Braunfeld, an orthodox Jewish merchant, charged that the Sunday closing
was a restriction on his free exercise of religion. His faith required the observance of a Saturday
Sabbath. Consequently, if Braunfeld obeyed both the tenets of his faith and the Sunday closing
law, his business would be closed Saturday and Sunday. He claimed this would result in a loss
of revenue and ultimately in the loss of his business. Braunfeld argued the law was unfair
because Sunday Sabbitarians were not forced to choose between their religion and their liveli-
hood. Braunfeld claimed his free exercise of religion was impaired because the Sunday closing
law forced him to choose between his religion and his business.
The Court characterized the law as secular in purpose and one with only an indirect effect
upon religious beliefs. "[T]he statute at bar does not make unlawful religious practices of appel-
lants; the Sunday closing law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants,
operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive." Id. at 605. The
Court held that the indirect burden on the free exercise of religion was justified by the state's
interest in providing one uniform day of rest which could not be accomplished by alternative
means not imposing the burden on religious freedom.
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analogous to be the controlling case. In Braunfeld, the Court sus-
tained a Sunday closing law while recognizing that the law undoubt-
edly served to make the religious practices of Orthodox Jewish mer-
chants more expensive. The Paty court concluded that here, as in
Braunfeld, the legislation only imposed an indirect burden on the
exercise of religion, and did not attempt to make a religious practice
itself unlawful.
The court also stated that the opposite result reached in Sherbert
v. Verner 29 could be clearly distinguished. In Sherbert, the United
States Supreme Court prohibited the denial of unemployment ben-
efits claimed by a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused a job requiring
Saturday labor. The court argued that the different results were jus-
tified by the fact that in Braunfeld the Sunday closing law was sup-
ported by the compelling state interest of providing a uniform day of
rest. The distinctions between the two cases are not as clear as the
court would lead us to believe. 30
Sherbert is more closely analogous to this case and should control
the outcome. Both in Sherbert and Paty the pressure upon the indi-
vidual to forgo a religious belief is unmistakable. Both individuals
were forced to choose between a religious belief (a Saturday Sabbath
in Sherbert and the ministry on the part of Rev. McDaniel) and a
public benefit (unemployment compensation in Sherbert and the
right to run for certain public offices in this case). In addition, the
deprivation the individuals suffered because of their religious beliefs
is analogous to a fine imposed for that particular belief. This is di-
rectly contrary to the protection afforded religious beliefs in Ever-
son. 31 Article IX, Section 1, of the Tennessee Constitution should be
declared an impairment of the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment, just as the denial of unemployment benefits was held to
be so in Sherbert.32
29. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The plaintiff in Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day Adven-
tist Church. The beliefs of that church call for a Saturday Sabbath. The plaintiff was denied
unemployment benefits by the Employment Security Commission, because she refused to ac-
cept employment requiring Saturday work, which was contrary to her religious beliefs. The
Court held the denial of benefits to be an impairment of the plaintiff's free exercise of religion.
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work on the other hand. Governmental imposition of
such a choice puts the same kind of a burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Id. at 404.
30. See Pfeffer, supra note 9, at 1138.
31. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
32. See Pfeffer, supra note 9, at 1138.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court offered one final argument. The
court feared that if ministers were elected to the proscribed offices,
they might propose or vote for legislation that in itself violates the
religious clauses of the First Amendment.33 This alleged harm, how-
ever, could easily be remedied by judicial review of legislation that
was enacted.3 4 Significantly, this alternative method would not im-
pose the unconstitutional burden on clergymen that Article IX, Sec-
tion 1, of the Tennessee Constitution does. The fact that clergymen
might support the views of their own church is insignificant and
should be of little concern to the government.
The basis of individual affiliations, whether they are political, so-
cial, or religious is a personal decision that individuals should be free
to make without government influence. All people support groups or
organizations with which they identify and associate and in which
they believe.3 5 Given the alternative means of judicial review to
protect the state interest, the harm feared by the Tennessee Supreme
Court is once again not compelling enough to warrant the impairment
of protected religious freedom.
The United States Supreme Court's
Predicted Analysis
Applying the general principles governing the free exercise area 36
33. The court especially feared that clergymen would propose and vote for legislation that
violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The legislation could take the form
of state aid to parochial schools or other forms of unpermitted church-state entanglement pro-
scribed by the United States Supreme Court. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(holding statutes providing financial support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by
way of reimbursement for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in
specified secular subjects unconstitutional); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (de-
claring mandatory daily Bible reading in the public schools unconstitutional); Engle v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (declaring unconstitutional a standardized daily prayer read in all public
schools).
34. Paty v. McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d 897, 911-12 (Brock, J. dissenting).
35. See generally L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 221-64 (Rev. Ed. 1967).
36. In testing laws under the religious clauses of the First Amendment two inquiries must
be made:
1. Are the purpose and primary effect of the law secular?
2. Does the state have a compelling interest in declining alternative legislative
measures involving no secondary religious effects? If on its face, the statute
manifests a purpose or necessary or primary effect which is religious, a presump-
tion of unconstitutionality attaches to it, and the burden of rebutting devolves
upon the government. Likewise, if the plaintiff demonstrates prima facie that in
its specific application, a law's primary effect is religious, the burden of rebutting
shifts to the state.
If the plaintiff tenders prima facie proof of a secondary religious effect, the
government must rebut the inference of the secondary effect, or prove that it has
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and following Sherbert, the United States Supreme Court should find
Article IX, Section 1, of the Tennessee Constitution to be a violation
of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The purpose of
the Tennessee provision is definitely religious: "[ministers] ought not
to be diverted from the great duties of their functions." 37  The pro-
priety of such a purpose is questionable.38 Given this religious pur-
pose, the state can only justify the restriction if it is necessary to
promote a compelling state interest and there exist no alternative
means which do not impose such a restriction in accomplishing the
state's goal. 39
The United States Supreme Court will most likely rule that the
interest asserted by the State of Tennessee -separation of church and
state 4 0-is not compelling enough to justify a restriction on the free
exercise of religion. The framers of the United States Constitution did
not feel compelled to include such a provision in the national docu-
ment, and no state other than Tennessee has such a provision in its
constitution. 41 Tennessee itself must not deem the interest too com-
pelling since it does not apply to all important elected offices. 42 It is
doubtful whether political activity by clergymen amounts to any
church-state problem. 43
considered alternative means free of such effects and that it has over-bearing
reasons for not adopting them.
Comment, A Uniform Valuation of the Religion Guarantees, 80 YALE L.J. 77, 98-101 (1970).
See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); McGowan v.. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
37. TENN. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
38. States should not be concerned with promoting the efficiency of ministers. Only the
individual church should be concerned with these matters. The only concern of the state
should be to prevent any impairment of the minister's ability to perform his or her duties. See
C. ANTINEAU, P. CARROLL, & T. BURKE, RELICION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
105-06 (1965).
39. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
[I]f the state regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the
purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is
valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may ac-
complish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.
Id. See also note 36 supra.
40. The term separation of church and state is meant to embody all the interests and fears
asserted by the State of Tennessee and the Tennessee Supreme Court.
41. A Maryland provision, MD. CONST. art. 3, § 11, almost identical to Article IX, Section
1, of the Tennessee Constitution, was struck down in 1974. See note 17 and accompany text
supra.
42. As discussed earlier, the restriction on the candidacy of ministers applies only to the two
houses of the state legislature. It does not apply to the governor of the state or other offices. See
note 26 and accompanying text supra.
43. "Obviously, a clergyman is neither more nor less a citizen than anyone else; and like
anyone else, he has the right and duty to strive for the political cause in which he believes. No
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The alternative means of judicial review of legislation 44 is a further
stumbling block to the provision's constitutionality. This alternative
means accomplishes the purpose of keeping church and state separate
while not penalizing clergymen for their religious belief as expressed
through their ministry. Absent a compelling state interest, and given
a less detrimental alternative means of protecting the asserted state
interest, Article IX, Section 1, of the Tennessee Constitution cannot
stand under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT
The Tennessee Supreme Court's Analysis
The Tennessee Supreme Court determined that Article IX, Section
1, of the Tennessee Constitution does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court recognized the
traditional two-tier analysis used in deciding equal protection
claims 45 and correctly set out the three criteria for deciding which
church-state problem is raised by such participation in politics." L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE
AND FREEDOM 221 (Rev. Ed. 1967).
44. See note 34 and accompanying text supra. The alternative of judicial review is not lim-
ited to laws instituted or voted for by clergymen. It can reach all state or federal actions affect-
ing the religious protections of the First Amendment. Judicial review is a useful tool for main-
taining the required separation of church and state.
45. The level of scrutiny given a law is often dispositive of an equal protection claim. Basi-
cally there are two levels of scrutiny. The first level is "rigid" scrutiny. This level is invoked
whenever the law being examined is based on suspect criteria. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage and nationality); or affects a fundamental right, Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the right to interstate travel). Laws based on suspect criteria or affecting a
fundamental right are presumed to be unconstitutional. Such laws are valid only if they further
a compelling state interest and there is no alternative means available to accomplish the state
goal that is not based on such criteria or affects the exercise of fundamental rights. See generally
Turkington, Equal Protection of The Laws In Illinois, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 385 (1976); Com-
ment, Compelling State Interest Test And The Equal Protection Clause -An Analysis, 6 CUM.
SAM. L. REV. 109 (1975); Winter, The Changing Parameters Of Substantive Equal Protection:
From The Warren To The Burger Era, 23 EMORY L.J. 657 (1974).
To be valid in the rigid scrutiny tier, the law must also be perfectly reasonable. That is, given
the law's purpose, it must not affect people it was not designed to reach, nor may it exclude
people in the class it was designed to reach. See Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 343-46 (1949). If the law fails to meet any of these require-
ments it is unconstitutional under the compelling state interest test.
The second tier may be termed "minimal" scrutiny. This level of examination was intended to
apply to areas not covered in the first tier. Here the law is presumed to be reasonable. The
state need only demonstrate that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See
e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The legislature is also free to attack a prob-
lem one step at a time. There is a broad allowance for overinclusiveness (where the law
reaches outside of its class) and underinclusiveness (where the law fails to reach people within its
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tier to apply. 46 The court, however, neither applied this criteria nor
set out its alternative criteria. Rather the court simply applied the
test from Bullock v. Carter,47 which the court read as an example of
middle scrutiny. 48 Middle scrutiny is not as rigid as the compelling
state interest test but provides that the law in question must be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest. 49 The Paty court felt
that the Bullock test was more than adequately satisfied since the
court deemed Tennessee's asserted state interest in separation of
church and state to be compelling. 50
The Tennessee Supreme Court seemed to rely on Bullock because
the individual right affected appeared to be the right of political can-
didacy-the same right asserted by Rev. McDaniel. Bullock, how-
ever, involved a qualified restriction on the right to run for public
office based on wealth. Classifications based on wealth are not usually
accorded rigid scrutiny under the compelling state interest test. 51
Carrington v. Rash 52 is more analogous to the situation presented
here. In Carrington, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law
purpose). Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The rational basis test almost
amounts to no scrutiny at all.
46. There are three factors that should be considered in deciding which tier of scrutiny to
apply. First, the character of the classification in question must be considered. Next, the indi-
vidual interest affected must be examined. Finally, one must take account of the interest as-
serted by the government. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
47. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
48. ". . . [T]he law must be found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate
state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster." Id. at 144. The two tier analysis has not
been strictly followed by the Supreme Court. There is a third tier or "middle" scrutiny that is
used in some areas.
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), was the first case to openly recognize the existence of
the third tier which the Court had been using in equal protection cases based on sex classifica-
tions. The test could aptly be called the "fair and substantial relationship" test. The test pro-
vides that for a law to be valid it must have a fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate
state objective. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Although only articulated in sex
based claims, the test has also been applied to equal protection challenges of classifications
based on illegitimacy. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968). See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, And The
Three Faces Of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 953 n.60 and accompanying text
(1975); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17-24 (1972).
49. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
50. If the state's interest is compelling there is obviously a fair and substantial relationship
between the law in question and a legitimate state purpose.
51. San Antonio Independant School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Discrimination
by wealth alone is not suspect. Wealth is suspect when an individual is unable to pay for a
benefit and as a result suffers an absolute deprivation of the benefit. Id. at 19-29.
52. 380 U.S. 89 (1965). In Carrington the Court struck down a Texas law prohibiting ser-
vicemen, who were stationed in Texas, from voting in state elections. The Court applied the
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forbidding servicemen from voting in local elections. The restriction
in Bullock was not as severe as the absolute restriction of voting
rights in Carrington 3 or the absolute denial of the right to run for
public office imposed on Rev. McDaniel. Carrington and the com-
pelling state interest test should govern here.
The United States Supreme Court's
Predicted Analysis
The Supreme Court should apply strict scrutiny in analyzing this
provision 54 because it is a classification which affects a fundamental
right.55 The right infringed upon by the provision is the right to
political candidacy, which by analogy is as fundamental as the right to
vote and freedom of association, 56 and therefore can be justified only
by a compelling state interest. 57 Although there are no Supreme
Court cases holding that the right to political candidacy is fundamen-
tal, the lower federal courts have clearly indicated that the right to
run for office should be accorded as much protection as the right to
vote. 5
8
compelling state interest test and held that sections of the population could not be "fenced out"
from the franchise because of a fear of the way they may vote. Id. at 94.
In Bullock, the Court found a Texas law requiring candidates to pay filing fees before being
eligible to run for office to be unconstitutional. Some of the fees ranged as high as $8900. The
test used in Bullock is not as clearly in the middle tier as the Tennessee Supreme Court would
lead us to believe. The Court in Bullock said the law must be given the same "close scrutiny"
that was used in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), 405 U.S. at 144. In
Harper, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, declared the Virginia poll tax to be a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the law must
be "closely scrutinized" because it affected a fundamental interest. The Court cited several cases
for this proposition including Carrington. All the cases cited employed the compelling state
interest test. 383 U.S. at 670. Thus, Bullock does not necessarily mean that middle scrutiny is
the appropriate tier for classifications restricting the right to run for office. See note 58 infra.
53. See note 52 supra.
54. See note 45 supra.
55. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). "[A]ny classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of. . . [a fundamental] right unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
government interest, is unconstitutional." Id. at 634.
56. The right to be a candidate in an election has been held to be a logical corollary of the
right to vote. See Jennes v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 926-27 (N. D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970); Le Clercq, The Emerging Federally Secured
Right of Political Participation, 8 IND. L. REV. 607, 619 (1975). The right to be a candidate
stems from two separate but related sources: first, it is a derivative of the right to vote because
candidacy restrictions have a great impact upon the right to cast a meaningful vote; second, it
stems directly from the right of political association. Id. at 625.
57. "[O]nly a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the state's con-
stitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
58. In American Independent Party v. Austin, 440 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Mich. 1976), the
court upheld a state of Michigan requirement that a political party submit a complete slate of
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Once it is determined that the compelling state interest test
applies, all that remains is to show that the provision does not meet
the exacting standards of that test.59 The articulated state interest in
separation of church and state is no more compelling here than it was
under the resolution of the free exercise issue. 60
Even ignoring the weight of the asserted state interest, the law
violates the equal protection clause because it is overinclusive. The
law affects people outside the scope of its purpose. 61 Article IX, Sec-
tion 1 is also underinclusive because, given the purpose of the law,
candidates in order to be listed on the ballot. The law was upheld only because it served a
"vital" governmental interest. Such an interest was required because the restriction affected the
right of the party to run candidates for office. Id. at 672. In Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st
Cir. 1973) the court of appeals stated:
In evaluating candidacy restrictions there are two interlocking interests, both
fundamental, that must be considered. We naturally consider the right asserted by
the plaintiff in claiming the opportunity to become a candidate for public office. But
whenever a state or city regulates the right to become a candidate for public office,
it also regulates the citizens' right to vote; the person or persons whose candidacy is
effected may be the voters' choice for public official.
Id. at 193 (emphasis added). Continuing, the court held that:
A view today, that running for public office is not an interest protected by the First
Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public
office was the preserve of the professional and the wealthy. Consequently we hold
that candidacy is both a protected First Amendment right and a fundamental inter-
est. Hence any legislative classification that significantly burdens that interest must
be subjected to strict equal protection review.
Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
In Lendall v. Bryant, 387 F. Supp. 397 (E. D. Ark. 1975) the court held that any restrictions
on the right to vote or run for office were constitutionally suspect and subject to the compelling
state interest test. Id. at 401. Applying the compelling state interest test, the court struck down
a Pennsylvania nomination by petition statute in Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa.
1975), aff'd without opinion at 424 U.S. 959 (1976).
In Duncatell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Texas 1971) the court found uncon-
stitutional a Houston ordinance requiring a filing fee and previous ownership of real estate as a
condition precedent to running for the City Council. The court applied the compelling state
interest test and held that the "right to seek public office is as fundamental in our governmental
process as the right to vote." Id. at 976. See also note 17 and accompanying text supra. But see
Walker v. Yucht, 352 F. Supp. 85 (D. Del. 1972). In Walker the district court upheld a Dela-
ware residency requirement for the office of State Representative. "Neither Turner nor Bullock
supports recognition of a right to run for political office sufficiently fundamental, in and of itself,
so as to require, in any attempt to justify candidacy restrictions, the demonstration of a compel-
ling state interest." Id. at 90.
59. See note 45 supra.
60. See notes 28, 34, 35, 39-44 and accompanying text supra.
61. The Court feared that if ministers were elected to the proscribed offices they would
exert a religious influence contrary to the requirement of separation of church and state. See
note 34 supra. Article IX, Section 1, of the Tennessee Constitution is patently overinclusive
because there are obviously some ministers who are well qualified for elected office and who
would be totally secular in their political activity.
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there are people the law was designed to reach who are unaffected by
it. 6 2
An additional ground for voiding the provision under the compel-
ling state interest test is the availability of a less detrimental alterna-
tive means. 63 As discussed in the free exercise analysis, the alterna-
tive means of judicial review of unconstitutional legislation is available
to accomplish the state objective. 64 This alternative means also ac-
complishes the state's goal without denying clergymen their funda-
mental right to run for political office.
Given these constitutionally fatal flaws, 65 Article IX, Section 1 of
the Tennessee Constitution cannot pass constitutional muster under
the compelling state interest test and therefore violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
If the United States Supreme Court reverses the decision of the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Paty v. McDaniel,66 two important in-
roads will be established in federal constitutional law. First, a holding
that Article IX, Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution violates the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment will significantly eluci-
date the application of the separation doctrine. It will become clear
that the "wall of separation" which the Court read into the Everson
decision is not an absolute prohibition. 67 The decision will also bring
the Tennessee Constitution into line with the United States Constitu-
tion and the constitutions of the forty-nine other states. 68
The second effect the decision will have is still more important. If
the Court applies the compelling state interest test, as suggested, and
declares Article IX, Section 1 to be in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will have formally
recognized the right to political candidacy as one of our fundamental
62. The law is also underinclusive because it will not stop noncleric religious advocates from
being elected and exerting the same type of influence on the legislature that Article IX, Section
1, was designed to prevent. Further, the provision does not apply to other offices where the
same harm could occur. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
63. See note 45 supra.
64. See notes 34, 35, & 44 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 60-62, & 64 and accompanying text supra.
66. 547 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1977).
67. See notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text supra.
68. Tennessee currently is the only state in the union that prohibits ministers from holding
a seat in the state legislature. See notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
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freedoms. 6 9 Courts will have to invoke rigid equal protection
scrutiny when reviewing claims of infringement upon this right.
There is no doubt that the right to run for public office should be
ranked among our most precious freedoms since it is so inextricably
bound to the fundamental freedoms of voting and association. 70  The
predicted decision will also demonstrate that our freedom of associa-
tion embodies further fundamental freedoms that have not previously
surfaced in United States constitutional case law.
Conversely, should the Court uphold the decision of the Tennessee
Supreme Court, the free exercise area will be left in a state of tur-
moil. 71 Further, the Court will have indicated that the fundamental
rights, which invoke the compelling state interest test, are strictly
limited to freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of associa-
tion, privacy, the right to vote, and the right to interstate travel. 72
This limitation would fiurther narrow the already restricted area of
fundamental rights for equal protection analysis. 73
Robert Nicholas Hermes
69. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court
limited the fundamental freedoms warranting rigid scrutiny to freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, freedom of association, the right to privacy, the right to interstate travel, and the right
to vote. After the Supreme Court decides Paty, the right to run for political office may be
added to the above six fundamental freedoms.
70. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
71. This decision will leave unclear the question of how absolute the "wall of separation"
between church and state must be. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
72. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
73. It is likely that the Court will avoid the equal protection issue and decide the case on
free exercise grounds. The Court will probably be unwilling to expand the area of fundamental
rights which it had so narrowly restricted in San Antonio.
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